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He was, as others have duly noted, a jurist of the very first
rank. As a lawyer in federal service and later as Governor of the
Virgin Islands, he was an auspicious representative of his peo-
ple, invariably willing to shoulder his acknowledged responsi-
bilities as an ambassador and a leader. As Dean of the Howard
Law School, he won the acclaim of students and colleagues alike
for his extraordinary intellect and marvelous teaching ability.
And lest we forget, William Henry Hastie earned the title "es-
quire" both for his comportment, which was gentlemanly, and
for his skill as an advocate, which was prodigious.
I knew Hastie in all of these capacities. In each he achieved
widespread and lasting fame. Nonetheless, without keen ap-
preciation of the interrelationship of these separate roles, some
of the fullness of his legal career is apt to be lost. Hastie's con-
tributions to the law cannot be measured solely by the power
and precision with which he pronounced it from the bench, nor
by the accomplishments of scores of younger lawyers who prof-
ited so handsomely by his tutelage and his example. Neither
can the impact of Hastie the lawyer be accurately evaluated
simply by scrutinizing the several landmark cases in which he
participated before the Supreme Court and other tribunals
about the land.'
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit. LL.B. 1939, Howard University.
1 Among the most notable cases in which Hastie was a principal were Fisher v.
Hurst, 333 U.S. 147 (1948) (enforcing the mandate of Sipuel v. Board of Regents,
332 U.S. 631 (1948) that blacks must be accorded access to professional schools of equal
quality with whites); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946) (described in the text);
Smith v. Allwright, 321* U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating Texas' "white primary" rules); and
Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (declaring unconstitutional separate
salary schedules for black and white public school teachers). In addition, he ably served
the NAACP as amicus curiae in, inter alia, Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945)
(upholding a New York law prohibiting discrimination in labor organizations) and Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (establishing under the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970), a duty of labor organizations that are exclusive
bargaining representatives of a craft or class to refrain from discrimination). He was a
prime mover in the effort to outlaw racially restrictive housing covenants that culminated
in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868 (1945).
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To grasp the point, one must first understand the meth-
odology by which a large volume of civil rights litigation was con-
ducted out of the nexus of the Howard Law School, civil rights
organizations, and dedicated lawyers across the country. In the
beginning, around 1940, besides Hastie there were Charles H.
Houston, architect of the modern Howard Law School and com-
mon mentor for those comprising a newly-formed legal corps;
Thurgood Marshall, Houston's up-and-coming protg&-des-
tined for the Supreme Court bench; James M. Nabrit, Jr., a
distinguished law professor who was to ascend to the presidency
of Howard University; Leon A. Ransom, another esteemed law
teacher; and George E. C. Hayes, a practitioner long revered
as an advocate. There were others, from near and far, and their
number increased as time marched on. So it was that during
Hastie's tenure as Dean that the Howard Law School became
headquarters for a legal collective bred by a shared purpose and
united by mutual respect.
Any lawyer anywhere with a meritorious case involving
an issue of racial discrimination could find help just for the ask-
ing. At any moment one might be confronted by another with
urgent need for anything from a co-author on a brief to a devil's
advocate for testing a troublesome point. When something
larger was in the offing, everyone available rushed together into
the breach. Ofttimes the identity of the last late-night com-
patriot who provided a crucial nuance or shored up .a sagging
syllogism went unacknowledged; sometimes even critical con-
tributions went unreflected in the listing of counsel on the briefs.
Oversights of that sort were of no moment, for those who la-
bored sought not glory but results, and the successes of that dif-
ficult era made it all worthwhile.
Hastie was a charter member of this informal but closely-
knit group, and one of its most faithful and ardent adherents.
He was unstinting in his willingness to assist and advance the
common objective. Despite the constantly heavy demands of his
deanship, he could always be counted on to respond to the plea
of a beleaguered brother-in-arms. More importantly and fortu-
nately for us and for our clients he brought into the joint effort
the rare and precious qualities that were distinctively his. No
one among us possessed greater facility as a logician or debater,
yet the talent we chiefly sought lay elsewhere. His courtly re-
serve was emblematic of an ability to approach problems from a
perspective divorced from the emotions of a lifetime-emotions
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felt deeply, but kept completely under control in his personal
and professional relationships. Calm and dispassionate presen-
tation of ideas was undeviatingly his manner, and clarity of ex-
pression his trademark.
Hastie had the knack of converting anyone's train of
thought, however abstruse or emotionally loaded, into words
having a cool but incisive thrust immediately accessible to his
readers. This is not to say merely that he was a great legal com-
poser; it is to say a great deal more. He could channel not only
legal propositions but also the aspirations of millions of black
Americans into prescriptions for social change capable of mov-
ing jurists who had to be persuaded of the merit of his argu-
ments-and acquainted with the moral virtue of their accep-
tance. Perhaps the clearest example of this faculty, and certainly
one of the most important, was the closing statement he com-
posed for the brief in Morgan v. Virginia2 on behalf of a black
woman convicted in 1944 for refusing to move to the rear of a
Virginia bus:
Today we are just emerging from a war in which all of
the people of the United States were joined in a death
struggle against the apostles of racism. We have already
recognized by solemn subscription to the Charter of the
United Nations... our duty, along with our neighbors,
to eschew racism in our national life and to promote
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." How much clearer,
therefore, must it be today, than it was in 1877,3 that
the national business of interstate commerce is not to be
disfigured by disruptive local practices bred of racial
notions alien to our national ideals, and to the solemn
undertakings of the community of civilized nations as
well.4
Another aspect of Morgan typifies both the modus operandi
of civil rights lawyers during the 1940's and the skill and strength
of Hastie's advocacy. As Dean of the Howard Law School,
Hastie appointed me to a faculty post at the Law School in 1939,
three months after my graduation therefrom. For much of the
2 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
'The reference is to Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
' Brief for Appellant at 28, Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
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ensuing decade, I was terribly busy learning at his feet, and
those of Houston, Marshall, and other first-rate legal craftsmen.
That golden opportunity was a principal reason for foregoing
my bar examination for four years and, for another four, com-
muting weekly from part-time law practice in Richmond to law
teaching at Howard. Ms. Morgan was my client, and I had rep-
resented her in the Virginia courts. Because all civil rights
litigation before Brown 5 in 1954 had been overshadowed since
1896 by the iminence grise of Plessy,6 the argument for Ms. Mor-
gan, modeled on the Supreme Court's 1877 decision in Hall v.
De Cuir,7 was that racial segregation in interstate travel trans-
gressed the federal commerce power. That approach was well
off the beaten track of fourteenth amendment due process and
equal protection, and required initiation into a different order
of constitutional mystery. When Morgan became ripe for appeal
to the Supreme Court, however, I did not qualify for admission
to its bar because I did not have the necessary three years as a
practitioner before the highest court of a state.
I called for help, and it came readily from Hastie and Mar-
shall. Both were steeped in the intricacies of that era's construc-
tion of the fourteenth amendment, but Morgan demanded a
mastery of the lore of the commerce clause, which was certainly
not their forte. Thus for a while the pupil, to his infinite delight,
had an opportunity to instruct the masters. They were apt stu-
dents, of course, and in no time they became learned in the
arcana of yet another area of constitutional law. They demon-
strated their newly acquired proficiency by adding substantially
to the quality of the brief and by presenting superb oral argu-
ments, which persuaded the Court to the soundness of our posi-
tion.
Indeed, for a moment during oral argument it seemed
that at least Hastie might have been too skilled. The segregation
practice to which Ms. Morgan had been subjected prompted in-
quiry from the bench about whether the issue called for an ap-
plication of the fourteenth amendment-an undertaking por-
tending a head-on collision with Plessy. I winced inwardly when
the question was put, for I knew Hastie was bursting with argu-
ments against Plessy's separate-but-equal doctrine which he
thought were irrefutable. In 1954 his conviction was vindicated,
5 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 536 (1896).
7 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
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but in 1946, when Morgan was argued, no one could predict
reliably how such a sweeping contention would fare. Hastie
quickly calculated the odds: an assault on separate-but-equal
might not only fail but might even divert the Court's focus from
the commerce clause thesis, which we felt was eminently sound.
So Hastie resisted the temptation to air his strongly held views
on Plessy, and instead took a course at once wise and bold. His
response was that the litigation before the Court neither re-
quired nor urged a reconsideration of Plessy, but he intimated
that someday he would be back with just such a challenge.
As fate would have it, that day never came for Hastie, al-
though it did for others. Hastie was a federal judge when, sev-
eral years later, we did return to the Court with that challenge
-in Brown and its companion cases. But our heritage from
Hastie's days in law practice remained with us to inspire that
arduous endeavor and enhance its success. It is hardly an over-
statement to say that those landmark decisions of the 1940's
and 1950's stand as intangible but indestructible monuments
to men like Hastie, as does the revival of the dreams and hopes
of countless Americans that followed in their wake.
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